The two standard interpretations of Kant's view of the relationship between external freedom and public law make one of the terms a means for the production of the other: either public law is justified as a means to external freedom, or external freedom is justified as a means for producing a system of public law. This article defends an alternative, constitutive interpretation: public law is justified because it is partly constitutive of external freedom. The constitutive view requires conceiving of external freedom in a novel, second-personal way, that is, as an irreducibly relational norm.
The third and most serious difficulty is related to the second. If external freedom really were essentially negative, it would stand in tension with Kant's repeated claims that practical freedom is essentially positive, the power to follow the moral law. Similarly, it would be odd if external freedom were not a species of 11 practical freedom. Let me explain. 12 If external freedom were essentially negative, it would amount to the power to choose for or against the law. The law would be externally related to the power of freedom. But Kant explicitly rejects this conception of freedom as the liberty of indifference.
As a general matter, Kant maintains that there is a conceptual, necessary connection between a causal power and its corresponding form of law. He says: 13 'the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely, an effect, must be posited' (G, 4: 446) . The concept of an effect necessarily presupposes the law according to which it was produced from a cause. To suppose otherwise would render a causal power unintelligible, since a causal power ungoverned by law would be a causal power that does not determine its effects, that is, a causal power without causal power, an absurdity.
Similarly, the very idea of a self-determining (free) causal power contains the idea of a law governing its activity. To suppose otherwise is to think of freedom as the liberty of indifference: 'freedom of choice cannot be defined -as some have tried
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom to define it -as the power to make a choice (durch das Vermögen der Wahl) for or against the law (libertas indifferentiae) ' (MM, 6: 226) . The liberty of indifference 14 represents a causal power as fundamentally undetermined by law. But again, Kant has argued that this would be a causal power without causal power, an absurdity. Freedom is not the power to choose for or against the law, but is instead a law-conferred power. Law is internal to freedom. And the very idea of a power always already makes reference to the law under which its activity is governed.
We may put this point differently, now in terms of Kant's contrast between two forms of unity, the unity of a compositum and that of a totum -an aggregate and a whole (CPR, A428/B466). The first is the contingent unity of a composite aggregated from simple (independently intelligible) parts, as in a heap of sand.
The second is the necessary unity of a whole constituted through the reciprocal relations of its parts, which parts are only intelligible in the whole. Kant deploys this distinction to argue that all of the following should be understood as wholes rather than aggregates: space and time (CPR, A428/B466), living beings as selfmaintaining wholes (CPJ, § §64-65), history as the whole of the development of the human species (TP, 8: 310) , or cognition as a system (CPR, A797/B825).
Similarly, I am suggesting that Kant understands the unity of law as that of a whole linking its parts (self-determining causal powers) in reciprocal relations.
The very idea of a person, qua self-determining causal power, already contains the idea of the bearer of that power as standing in reciprocal relations to others
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By contrast, the view that external freedom is essentially negative supposes that the unity of law is that of an aggregate, a unity external to its parts. To be externally free would be equivalent to the liberty of indifference. And this, Kant has argued, is to misunderstand the relationship between a free being -as a causal power -and the law which constitutes it as a causal power.
These considerations suggest an alternative conception of external freedom, one I will call 'second-personal'. To present this reading, let me say a few words first about how I will understand the idea of a second-personal norm.
Stephen Darwall has distinguished first-, second-and third-personal reasons (Darwall 2006: 4-12) . Roughly, a third-personal reason is one that refers to the impersonal value of an outcome to be promoted (e.g. well-being); a merely firstpersonal reason is one that refers to an agent's standing before a norm, regardless of that agent's interpersonal relations (e.g. an agent's standing before a logical norm); and a second-personal reason refers to interpersonal norms governing the claims one agent has on another or, equivalently, the duties one agent owes another (e.g. the rights of one agent against another). To borrow an example from Darwall, consider the different kinds of reasons you may have not to step on another's gouty toe. If you appeal exclusively to the bad state of affairs that would be produced, say, in terms of the other's suffering, then you would appeal to a third-personal kind of reason. By contrast, if you appeal exclusively to the
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom other's right against you that you not step on her toe or, equivalently, to the duty you owe the other to the same effect, then you would appeal to a second-personal kind of reason. This distinction is rough, but it should suffice for our purpose. 15 I now want to suggest that this distinction in kinds of practical reasons can be fruitfully applied to Kant's idea of the right to external freedom. On the freedombased view, the right to external freedom would be grounded in a first-personal reason (e.g. the value of the capacity to set ends) or in a third-personal one (e.g. the undesirability of being interfered with in one's movement). By contrast, I am suggesting that the right to external freedom has an irreducibly second-personal structure. This means that the right to external freedom is an irreducibly relational norm, linking the right of one agent to the duty of another. This conception is second-personal, then, in the sense that it treats the right to freedom as an 'axiom of right' and grants ultimate normative significance to the relationship of right itself.
A second-personal conception opens up space for conceiving of external freedom as essentially positive. External freedom is indeed the title of one agent to not be subordinated to the will of another, but external freedom is also and fundamentally the dependence of the will on the practical law. So understood, the practical law is not externally related to a self-determining causal power.
Instead, the practical law just is the form of the relationship between persons.
The unity of practical law -moral law and public law -is that of whole, not that show how it supports a constitutive view of the justification of public law.
The Universal Principle of Right: A Reciprocal Second-Personal Norm
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If external freedom were an essentially positive and second-personal idea, we would expect Kant's view to be that external freedom is dependence on practical law. As I will now argue, that is exactly Kant's view: external freedom is dependence on two internally related kinds of practical law, your dependence on a priori practical laws (the metaphysical principles of right) and on a posteriori laws (public laws) (MM, 6: 237) . This section covers the former, the next the latter.
The supreme, a priori principle of a system of right is the Universal Principle of Right (henceforth, UPR):
[UPR] Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law. (MM, 6: 230) Of course, at first sight, UPR can appear ambiguous. Should we understand 'everyone's freedom' in negative, first-personal terms, or in positive, secondpersonal ones? As we have seen, Kant's statement of what he means by external freedom does not settle the interpretative issue.
Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that UPR is essentially a second-personal principle of positive freedom. Kant makes it clear that UPR is a principle of
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom positive freedom when he qualifies any right action as one that must be consistent with the freedom of all 'in accordance with a universal law'. The idea behind UPR is not that an action is right simply when it does not interfere with the exercise of my capacity to set ends. Instead, the idea is that any action is right when it is consistent with and determined by a universal law governing the interactions between persons as equals. I exercise my external freedom when I act in a way consistent with your equal freedom. But this is equivalent to saying that my action is right when my power of choice is in agreement with, or depends on, a universal practical law. And this is the first manifestation of the idea that external freedom is a genuine species of practical freedom: one is externally free not only when one is independent from the constraining choice of others but primarily when one's actions are in agreement with or depend on a universal law relating one to others in a rightful manner. To act rightly under UPR is to 17 exercise one's external freedom positively.
Pursuing further the earlier analogy with forms of unity, on the proposed reading the unity of UPR is that of a whole (totum): the law as a whole is prior to and determines its parts (externally free persons) into reciprocal relations. By contrast, if UPR manifested the unity of an aggregate (compositum), the law would be external to free persons, and the relations between such persons would be accidental. The negative conception sees the individual power as prior and then construes the law as an aggregate of accidental relations between individuals.
Conversely, the positive, second-personal conception sees the law as prior and From the standpoint of rights, a self-determining power is a juridical power (facultas juridica), that is, the power to coercively bind others in accordance with universal law. UPR, then, is a basic norm of reciprocity in the sense that my 18 innate right (my basic status as a juridical power) binds you to respect my external freedom, but in so binding you, I am always already bound to you in the very same way. Kant puts this point by saying that the innate right to freedom necessarily involves the authorization to innate equality: 'that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them' (MM, (6) (7) (8) . 19 And UPR is a basic directed norm in the sense that the duties it requires are owed to others. Directed norms contrast with undirected norms: the infringement of a directed norm is a wrong to another; the infringement of an undirected is a wrong action simpliciter (MM, In a word, UPR is a second-personal norm not simply because it captures an irreducibly second-personal kind of reason but, more specifically, because it takes a reciprocal and directed form.
Synthesizing the reciprocal and directed form of UPR we can now say that UPR is the basic a priori form of positive outer freedom. When you act rightly, in accordance with the rights of others, your action is determined by a universal law.
One way to put the point is in terms of Kant's distinction of two normative positions: the position of binding another and that of being bound (der Verhältnis der Verpflichtenden und Verpflichteten) (MM, 6: 241) . UPR represents these two 22 positions in a reciprocal and directed manner: qua juridical power I have an innate right by which I bind you, so that -equivalently -you are bound to me, but your duty to me is equivalent to your binding me in virtue of your innate right and thus my being bound to you. In UPR these two positions of binding and being bound are perfectly interchangeable. The perfect interchangeability of these two positions is a form of self-determination, or what Kant also calls the self-legislative or autonomous character of the will. In the Groundwork Kant says that your will is self-legislating when it is subject to (or bound by) laws of which it can, at the same time, regard itself as the author (or someone in the binding
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom position) (G, 4: 432) . A self-legislating will is one that embodies the reciprocal form of relation between the two normative positions of binding and being bound. This is exactly what happens when you act in accordance with UPR. You manifest a form of autonomy, the positive aspect of external freedom.
In sum, it emerges that UPR is a paradigmatically second-personal norm, rather than a first-personal one. UPR is not grounded in a non-relational value, such as the value of exercising the capacity to set ends. Instead, UPR represents the 'axiom of right' that persons are constituted by their external freedom in a reciprocal and directed relationship to one another. Your duty to respect my innate right to freedom entails and is entailed by my duty to respect your equal innate right to freedom. That is because my right and your duty are necessary aspects of one and the same normative whole, which whole just is the a priori law of right.
This second-personal interpretation of external freedom supports a constitutive interpretation of the justification of law. External freedom and UPR are not related to one another as means to end. Instead, the law (here UPR) is constitutive of the external freedom of each person. To be a juridical person just is to have a normative standing in relation to others constituted by the a priori law of right. The law is a totum, manifesting the internal relationship of constitution between the law as whole and the parts it constitutes into reciprocal relations.
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If this reading is correct, it also suggests that Kant's second-personal idea of law and external freedom is necessarily social and embodied. It is social because freedom is constituted in one's relationship to another. And it is embodied because the innate right to freedom is, in the first instance, one's right to move one's own body in terms of equality and reciprocity with others. This view 
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I have just suggested that for Kant UPR is an a priori principle of external freedom: when you act consistently with the equal innate rights of others, you follow a law constitutive of your right to external freedom. The relationship between external freedom and the universal law of UPR is not one of means to end. Instead, the law constitutes external freedom, the normative power (facultas juridica) to have rights against and duties to others. UPR has an irreducibly second-personal form, for it constitutively links persons under a reciprocal and directed norm.
We are now in a position to see how public law develops this basic secondpersonal structure. The relationship between external freedom and public law is
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom not one of means to end. Instead, public law constitutes external freedom in virtue of its public or omnilateral form, specifically the standing of persons as subjects and possible co-legislators of said law.
In eighteenth-century fashion, Kant formulates the argument for public law in terms of an exit from the state of nature, a device for representing a condition where public law is absent. What makes such a condition defective, Kant argues, is its moral incoherence: should you and I inhabit a state of nature we would simultaneously be governed by UPR and necessarily contravene it. In the state 25 of nature we are governed by UPR, so we are entitled to claim rights against each other. But the juridical nature of our rights means also that we are entitled to enforce our rights. As Kant emphasizes, our innate right also authorizes us to do 'what seems right and good … and not to be dependent upon another's opinion about this' (MM, 6: 312) . If in the state of nature I were bound to acquiesce to your interpretation of your own rights, I would become subject to your will, thereby contravening UPR. But if you were bound to acquiesce to my interpretation of my own rights, you would become subject to my will, contravening UPR. The moral incoherence emerges, then, from the fact that we are both entitled to enforce our respective interpretations of our own rights and that this enforcement is necessarily unilateral rather than reciprocal. 26 Kant also puts this point by characterizing the state of nature as a condition of savage and lawless freedom (PP, 8: 105; TP, MM, (6) (7) (8) 354) .
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The state of nature is a condition of lawless freedom because in it each 'follows its own judgement' about her own rights, rather than a public and universal judgement. But in so doing, each unilaterally imposes on the other her own interpretation of her rights, thereby contravening the reciprocal form of UPR.
Deploying once again Kant's distinction between two forms of unity, we could say that the state of nature is lawless because the law here is at best a compositum, PPR thus develops the reciprocal and directed second-personal UPR into a new normative form. This new form is distinctive because it is non-reciprocal and omnilateral. A public authority is non-reciprocal because it has authority over its subjects, while the subjects have no authority over it. Indeed, if the authority relationship were reciprocal, there would be no solution to the moral incoherence of the state of nature. Coordinated with the individual duty to establish a public authority is the public authority's right to rule. And lest the right to rule be unmoored from its normative principle, the legislation, enforcement and adjudication of law (the exercise of public authority) must itself have a public form. A public authority must be omnilateral, acting on behalf of all its subjects.
Public law is not the supremacy of a single man's will. A public authority signals the supremacy of law in our interactions. 29 Following Arthur Ripstein, we may explain the non-reciprocal and omnilateral public form of the law in terms of status relations (Ripstein 2009: 192-3) . The basic feature of status relations is that one party acts on behalf of another by fulfilling the mandate of her specific status. Thus, as a parent you can make arrangements for your child insofar as you follow your mandate of acting on
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom behalf of your child, respecting and promoting the child's independence. More generally, employers, doctors, flight attendants and teachers have authority over you so long as they act within the mandate of their specific status and that mandate is consistent with your innate right.
Similarly, a public authority has non-reciprocal authority over its subjects so long as it acts on behalf of all its subjects by fulfilling the mandate of its specific status.
That mandate is making possible the interaction among its subjects on terms consistent with their reciprocal freedom. Thinking of a public authority as fulfilling its status relationship over its subjects requires distinguishing the mandate of the specific status (or office) from the person occupying that status, as Ripstein suggests (Ripstein 2009: ch. 7, §B) . Thus when a public authority exercises its authority over you, it is the law that has authority over you rather than the specific person promulgating, adjudicating or enforcing it. And this authority is compatible with your status as an equal rights bearer because of its omnilateral form, that is, the public authority acting on behalf of all its subjects in making their reciprocal freedom possible.
Another way to put this point is in terms of Kant's distinction between the public and the private use of reason. Each use is characterized by a distinctive kind of addressee (O'Neill 1986: 528) . While a public use of reason has an unrestricted (cosmopolitan) addressee, such as humanity at large, the private use of reason 'is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which one is
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom entrusted' (WE, 8: 37) . The private use of your reason is restricted, then, by the relationship you have to your audience, a relationship institutionalized through a certain 'civil post or office' with which you are entrusted. In so exercising reason, you are 'carrying out another's commission' (WE, 8: 38) . The thought, then, is that any official exercising public authority (making, enforcing or adjudicating the law) makes a private use of reason insofar as the official carries out another's commission: making possible a system of reciprocal external freedom. In one sense a public authority thus manifests a private use of reason, since officials are only permitted to act so as to constitute reciprocal freedom, but in another, a public authority manifests a public use of reason, since officials are entrusted with constituting the freedom of all subjects, regardless of any distinctions among them in terms of socio-economic status, religious or political beliefs, ethnicity, etc.
These reflections on status suggest that there is a trace of second-personal normativity in public law itself. The law's validity derives from its source in a public authority. The law's normative structure consists of the special status relationship 30 between ruler and ruled. Abstract away from the relationship of a public authority to its subject, the relationship between ruler and ruled, and the normativity of public law disappears from view.
Putting these thoughts together, Kant's contention is that you have a legal obligation to do the public authority's command, not in virtue of the law's justice, but rather in virtue of the law's source in a public authority. Kant's contention is that the bindingness of the law does not stem from an independent moral standard, such as the independent value of autonomy or well-being, but rather from an a priori argument for a public authority (PPR) granting that public authority the right to rule through the promulgation, adjudication and enforcement of the law.
At the same time, the very idea of the omnilateral form of a public authority already contains the idea of the law's justice. Kant calls this normative dimension the idea of the original contract (henceforth, IOC):
[IOC] Now this is an original contract, on which alone a civil and hence thoroughly rightful constitution among human beings can be based and a commonwealth established … It is instead only an idea of reason … namely to bind every legislator to give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will. For this is the touchstone of any public's law conformity with right. In other words, if a public law is so constituted that a whole people could not possibly give its consent to it (as, e.g., that a certain class of subjects should have the hereditary privilege of ruling rank), it is unjust; but if it is only possible that a people could agree to it, it is a duty to consider the law just, even if the people is at present in such a 
Kant's generic idea of freedom is self-determination through law. Public law develops this model. IOC thus formulates the idea of reason immanent to any public law: in following public law you follow a law internal to your external freedom. Although public law binds you by the contingent choice of the legislator, in the ideal case the law binding you is equivalent to your thinking of yourself as the author of the law. IOC thus gives institutional form to the second-personal idea of self-legislation, where the normative positions of legislator and subject are in principle interchangeable. IOC is thus the regulative norm internal to the public authority introduced by PPR. For the law to take an omnilateral form is for that law to bind you as the possible legislator of said law. Indeed, public law introduces your status as co-legislator with every other subject to the law.
Kant's discussion of the idea of the original contract makes it particularly perspicuous that he has the constitutive model in mind. Consider another passage about IOC, now from the Doctrine of Right:
The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state… And one cannot say: the human being in a state has sacrificed a part of his innate outer freedom for the sake of an end, but rather, he has relinquished entirely his wild, lawless freedom in order to find his freedom as such undiminished, in a dependence
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom upon laws, that is, in a rightful condition, since this dependence arises from his own lawgiving will. (MM, 6: 316) This passage can be taken as evidence that Kant would have rejected both the freedom-based and the public law-based views. This passage uniquely supports the constitutive model. Let me explain by paraphrasing this passage.
For the freedom-based view, the human being in a state sacrifices a part of his external freedom for the sake of an end, namely, protecting one's independent interest in external freedom. But Kant here explicitly rejects that view, as one that favours the negative conception of external freedom as a 'lawless freedom'.
Instead, Kant characterizes the transition to the civil condition in terms of positive external freedom. When you live under public law, you find your 'freedom as such undiminished, in a dependence upon laws'. That is precisely the claim of the constitutive reading: your external freedom is partly constituted by public law.
For the public law-based view, public laws are an end to which individual rights to external freedom are means. But if that were so, it would not be possible for one's dependence upon laws to be equivalent to a dependence that 'arises from one's own lawgiving will'. If external freedom rights could be subordinated to the higher collective aim of establishing the law, the law could not be an expression of external freedom. An arbitrary law could not arise from your own lawgiving will. That can only be so when the idea behind public law is constitutive: in
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Dependence upon public law can only be fully rightful when it institutes a system of reciprocal freedom and one in which subjects can regard themselves as colegislators. 34 It emerges that the constitutive reading is uniquely poised to capture the normative structure of public law, as Kant expresses it through IOC. Public law is not a means nor an end as such. Public law develops Kant's general idea of the relationship between freedom and law. Freedom is not the power to choose for or against the law. Instead, positive external freedom is partly the power to follow public law.
Two Objections
The central thought I have been defending is that for Kant the relationship between external freedom and public law is not one of means-end (regardless of direction) but one of constitution. Before closing I want to consider briefly two objections to this line of interpretation. Defenders of public law-based views are apt to object that my second-personal interpretation fudges the line between individual and collective ends. Defenders of freedom-based views are apt to object that my second-personal interpretation is viciously circular. I will now argue that neither objection is forceful. Let me begin with the public law-based objection.
When briefly considering the possibility of a constitutive interpretation, Katrin " 28
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Flikschuh warns that such an exegetical possibility should be approached with caution, for 'it is liable to fudge the difference between individualistic and nonindividualistic ends in Kant's morality of Right' (Flikschuh forthcoming: 1).
Flikschuh does not explain why this conceptual fudge is likely nor why it would be problematic. I suspect that her concern may be with reducing public lawgiving to a merely private or individualistic model or, alternatively, with inflating external freedom into a purely public model. Nevertheless, neither reduction nor inflation need be feared on the constitutive model. The claim that public law is partly constitutive of external freedom does not reduce public lawgiving to a merely private end. This was precisely the point I have emphasized by pursuing the analogy between law and the idea of unity as a whole rather than as an aggregate. A private model of law would indeed reduce the normativity of law to the convergence of private judgements. Law would be an aggregate of private judgements about right. By contrast, on the proposed reading, public law develops the unity of a whole characteristic of UPR. Just as UPR is a universal law prior to any of the parts it determines, so too public law is a whole prior to the judgements of the individuals subject to it. That is precisely what distinguishes public law from mere generalizations in the state of nature.
The claim that public law is partly constitutive of external freedom does not inflate external freedom into a purely public end. That is because in UPR external freedom has an a priori dimension that functions as a regulative idea for
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom the evaluation of actual public law. This is the reason why, when formulating IOC, Kant claims that the state in idea 'serves as a norm (norma) for every actual union into a commonwealth' (MM, 6: 313) . Although the innate right to external freedom is constituted by an a priori universal law, this law has yet to manifest itself into the truly public form of positive law. This distinction, then, preserves rather than fudges a distinction between private and public ends. I want to concede that on the constitutive account there is an internal relationship between external freedom and law, such that neither can be fully understood independently of the other. Nevertheless, this does not entail a problematic circularity. The charge of circularity supposes that the only way to get a grip on the idea of external freedom is to ground normative concepts in pre-normative ones. From that perspective, Kant's account will surely look circular.
What these critics miss is that Kant's argument is not circular but developmental. 35 Kant begins with an original idea of freedom and law, namely, UPR. In the order of justification, this idea functions as an axiom, for it is not grounded in any further considerations. Nevertheless, as the argument about the incoherence of the state of nature makes explicit, the original norm is too abstract and indeterminate to offer normative guidance by itself. Kant argues that we must develop UPR into two further a priori norms, namely, PPR and IOC. These norms are more specific than UPR because they introduce a novel normative form concerning the relationship between a public authority and its subjects.
These norms represent the duty of individuals to establish a rightful condition and the duty of a public authority to exercise its mandate in agreement with the original right to freedom of each of its subjects. Still, these norms remain too abstract and indeterminate. This does not betray a hidden circle. And it does not call for ultimate grounding in a pre-normative value. Instead, Kant's argument is
The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom that it calls for the activity of a public institution. Through legislation, adjudication and enforcement of law, a public authority must render more specific and determinate the abstract metaphysical principles of right. This is an instance of Kant's approach to the generality of concepts. The universal form of any concept means that the concept by itself cannot determine its own application to specific empirical circumstances. Further, more determinate concepts can help, but eventually concepts run out. Judgement is required, relating the universal concept to the particular circumstance, for if a rule were required for the application of rules, an infinite regress would ensue (CPR, A133-4/B172-4; CPJ, 5: 169). Similarly, in a system of right, a public authority enacts public judgement through its laws and through the enforcement and adjudication of said laws, thereby relating the abstract metaphysical principles of right to concrete empirical circumstances.
In short, what the objection appears to miss is that for Kant the activity of a public authority is not an accident to the metaphysics of right but its necessary embodiment. Kant, as it were, defends an 'institutional hylomorphism', the view that the metaphysical principles of right are incomplete and imperfect without embodiment in an institutional setting. But this is just another way of putting the main thesis of the constitutive interpretation, namely, that your external freedom is partly constituted by public law.
This view may strike some readers of Kant as surprising, for it seems to bring " 32
Kant closer to the Hegelian view that freedom is essentially a social and institutional achievement. On the contrary, a close reading of Kant's Doctrine of Right seems to reveal that Hegel's celebrated social view of freedom may not have been as novel as it is often thought to be. G, [4] [5] [6] [7] MM, 6: 214; and CPrR, 5: 33 . humanity, that is, in our capacity to set ends according to reason. I am now suggesting that the right to freedom protects a rational agent's ability to make choices in generalthat is, her ability to set and pursue ends for herself ' (2010: 800) . G, [4] [5] [6] [7] MM, 6: 214; and CPrR, 5: 33. 11 For an illuminating and unusual defense of the view that external freedom is a genuine Gregor translates Vermögen here as 'ability' but I think the term 'power' is more apt.
Conclusion
14 Whereas an ability may be pre-normative and may not require a power-constituting law, the idea of 'power', at least as Kant understands it, makes necessary reference to the law that constitutes something as a power.
Elsewhere I develop this distinction in more detail and raise some difficulties for Of course, as is well known, Kant argues that the forms of determination of the will by 17 a practical law are different in the juridical and ethical cases. In the ethical case, the moral law must be the incentive to my action; in the juridical case it suffices that my action be in agreement with the moral law -in the guise of UPR (MM, (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) . Both, I am arguing, are species of practical freedom: one is internal, the other external, since the moral law retains a degree of externality in the juridical case, such that it need not be the incentive to my act for it to determine my action.
A power to bind another is juridical in the sense that the correlative duty is enforceable. For discussion see Weinrib 1996 , Thompson 2004 and Darwall 2013 Of course, this assumes that morality brings within its purview our relationship to the 21 natural environment and that this relationship can be understood in terms independent of our wronging one another. ground UPR in a further, non-relational value. Nevertheless, Flikschuh's criticism is not completely off target, for Ripstein continues to insist that the right to external freedom presupposes 'non-relational capacities' (Ripstein forthcoming: 12). A concern with this move is that it grounds the relational right to external freedom in a non-relational and empirical capacity. As such, this capacity would then be understood independently of the law, leading to a conception of the law as an aggregate. By contrast, on the second-personal reading I develop here, Kant's very idea of a power of purposiveness must itself be construed in relational, second-personal terms. This is an instance of my earlier point that for Kant a power is not prior to law, but, conversely, a normative power in general is lawconferred and thus law-constituted.
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Strangely, in denying that the innate right to freedom can admit of empirical 24 instantiation, Flikschuh hints at this view (forthcoming). Yet Kant's discussion of the innate right to freedom as necessarily embodied sits oddly with such a view. See Kant's remarks on the difference between that which is 'internally' mine or innate and that which is 'externally' mine or acquired (MM, 6: 237, As Kant puts it in TP, the idea of your status as a co-legislator is the synthesis of two 34 previous aspects of your status, your freedom and your equality (TP, 8: 290) . The law constitutes you as a free being by making you a co-legislator, thus realizing your equal freedom.
Although I cannot show this here, I think this political structure of thought organizes the development of the categorical imperative in Kant's Groundwork. The first formula (universality) concerns your freedom in relation to the law; the second formula concerns your equality to others; and the third (Kingdom of Ends) concerns your status as co-legislator of the moral law. 
